


# Exhibit B



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**DISTRICT COURT**  
**CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

JGB VEGAS RETAIL LESSEE, LLC,  
Plaintiff,

v.

STARR SURPLUS LINES INSURANCE  
COMPANY,  
Defendant.

Case No.: A-20-816628-B  
Dept. No.: XIII

**ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT  
STARR SURPLUS LINES INSURANCE  
COMPANY'S MOTION TO DISMISS  
COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE**

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1 In the event of failure of the Insurer to pay any amount claimed to be due hereunder,  
2 the Insurer, at the request of the Insured, will submit to the jurisdiction of a court of  
3 competent jurisdiction within the United States. Nothing in this condition constitutes  
4 or should be understood to constitute a waiver of the Insurer's rights to commence an  
5 action in any court of competent jurisdiction in the United States, to remove an action  
6 to a United States District Court, or to seek transfer of a case to another court as  
permitted by the laws of the United States or any state in the United States. It is  
further agreed . . . that [for] any suit instituted against the Insurer upon this policy, the  
Insurer will abide by the final decision of such court or of any appellate court in the  
event of an appeal.

7 Policy, Endt. 27. The Service of Process Clause Endorsement continues, that "pursuant to any statute  
8 of any state, territory, or district of the United States," Starr "designates the Superintendent,  
9 Commissioner or Director of Insurance, or other officer specified for that purpose in the statute" as  
10 its agent for service of process. *Id.* The Court finds that there is a conflict between these two  
11 provisions and, as an endorsement, the Service of Process Clause Endorsement governs over the  
12 forum selection clause in the Policy's form. *See Tri-Union Seafoods, LLC v. Starr Surplus Lines Ins.*  
13 *Co.*, 88 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1162-65 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that the Service of Suit Endorsement  
14 "changed the original insurance agreement" that contained a forum selection clause and  
15 "unambiguously permits Plaintiff to bring suit in a forum of its choosing."); *Wayne Cnty. Airport*  
16 *Auth. v. Allianz Glob. Risks U.S. Ins. Co.*, No. 11-15472, 2012 WL 3134074, at \*3 (E.D. Mich. Aug.  
17 1, 2012) ("[Insurers] seek dismissal and enforcement of the forum selection clause that was  
18 bargained away. The [insurers] are not entitled to enforce the forum selection clause in the policy  
19 over that in the endorsement."). Moreover, Starr has failed to show that Nevada is an inconvenient  
20 forum to justify dismissal. *See* N.R.S. 13.050(2)(c); *Provincial Gov't of Marinduque v. Placer*  
21 *Dome, Inc.*, 131 Nev. 296, 300-07, 350 P.3d 392, 396-400 (2015). Accordingly, this action is  
22 properly within the jurisdiction of this Court, and Starr's Motion to Dismiss on forum is denied.

23 The Court next analyzes Starr's arguments for dismissal under NRCP 12(b)(5). When a court  
24 considers a motion to dismiss under NRCP 12(b)(5), the "court will recognize all factual allegations  
25 in [the] complaint as true and draw all inferences in its favor." *Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las*  
26 *Vegas*, 124 Nev. 224, 227-28, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008). "A complaint need only set forth sufficient  
27 facts to demonstrate the necessary elements of a claim for relief so that the defending party has  
28 adequate notice of the nature of the claim and relief sought." *W. States Constr., Inc. v. Michoff*, 108

1 Nev. 931, 936, 840 P.2d 1220, 1223 (1992). Thus, the complaint “should be dismissed only if it  
2 appears beyond a doubt that [the plaintiff] could prove no set of facts, which, if true, would entitle  
3 [the plaintiff] to relief.” *Buzz Stew*, 124 Nev. at 228, 181 P.3d at 672.

4 On the first cause of action, JGB states a ~~valid~~ claim for relief for breach of the Policy. The  
5 Policy’s initial coverage grant provides that it “covers the property insured hereunder against all  
6 risks of direct physical loss or damage to covered property while at INSURED LOCATIONS  
7 occurring during the Term of this POLICY, except as hereinafter excluded or limited.” Policy,  
8 Property Coverage, General Conditions, § 1; *see* Compl. ¶¶ 30-32. The Policy also provides certain  
9 “TIME ELEMENT” coverages for business interruption losses; the main section provides coverage  
10 for “[l]oss directly resulting from necessary interruption of the Insured’s NORMAL business  
11 operations caused by direct physical loss or damage to real or personal property covered herein[.]”  
12 Policy, Business Interruption, § 1; *see* Compl. ¶¶ 33-40. Also included in the TIME ELEMENT  
13 COVERAGE is “Interruption by Civil or Military Authority.”<sup>3</sup>

14 JGB’s Complaint alleges the physical presence and known facts about the coronavirus,  
15 including that it spreads through infected droplets that “are physical objects that attach to and cause  
16 harm to other objects” based on its ability to “survive on surfaces” and then infect other people.  
17 Compl. ¶¶ 16-20. JGB also alleges that by March 11, 2020, COVID-19 was present at the Mirage  
18 casino, within one mile from JGB’s Grand Bazaar Shops. *Id.* ¶ 21. JGB alleges that based on these  
19 facts and the location and characteristics of the Grand Bazaar Shops, that it was “highly likely that  
20 the novel coronavirus that causes COVID-19 has been present on the premises of the Grand Bazaar  
21 Shops, thus damaging the property JGB had leased to its tenants.” *Id.* ¶ 26; *see also id.* ¶ 7. The  
22 Complaint also states that because the presence of COVID-19 at or near the Grand Bazaar Shops and

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23  
24 <sup>3</sup> The coverage part for “Interruption by Civil or Military Authority” provides that:

25 This POLICY is extended to include, starting at the time of physical loss or damage, the actual loss  
26 sustained by the Insured, resulting directly from an interruption of business as covered hereunder,  
27 during the length of time, not exceeding the number of days shown under TIME LIMITS stated in  
28 the Declarations, when, as a direct result of damage to or destruction of property within one (1)  
statute mile of an INSURED LOCATION by the peril(s) insured against, access to such described  
premises is specifically prohibited by order of civil or military authority.

Policy, Business Interruption, § 7.

1 Governor Sisolak's March 20, 2020 Order restricting and prohibiting access to non-essential  
2 business, the Grand Bazaar Shops were forced to close and the few restaurants that remained open  
3 were severely limited in their operations, resulting in significant losses. *Id.* ¶¶ 26-28.

4 The Court finds that JGB's Complaint sufficiently alleges losses stemming from the direct  
5 physical loss and/or damage to property from COVID-19 to trigger Starr's obligations under the  
6 property and TIME ELEMENT coverage provisions in the Policy, including coverage for general  
7 business interruption and Interruption by Civil or Military Authority. *See, e.g., Studio 417, Inc. v.*  
8 *Cincinnati Ins. Co.*, No. 20-cv-03127, 2020 WL 4692385, at \*2, \*4 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 12, 2020)  
9 (complaint alleged direct physical loss, because it alleged that the virus "is a physical substance,"  
10 which "live[s] on" and is "active on inert physical surfaces," and that "it is likely that customers,  
11 employees, and/or other visitors to the insured properties were infected with COVID-19 and thereby  
12 infected the insured properties with the virus" and "the presence of COVID-19 'renders physical  
13 property in their vicinity unsafe and unusable'").<sup>4</sup>

14 Starr also moves to dismiss JGB's claim for breach of contract (and related claims) on the  
15 basis that any loss or damage suffered by JGB is nonetheless excluded by the Policy's "Pollution and  
16 Contamination Exclusion." Motion to Dismiss at 24-26; Reply at 24-27. The Pollution and  
17 Contamination Exclusion provides:

18 b. Pollution and Contamination Clause:

19 This POLICY does not insure against loss or damage caused by or  
20 resulting from any of the following regardless of any cause or event  
contributing concurrently or in any other sequence to the loss:

- 21 1. contamination;
- 22 2. the actual or threatened release, discharge, dispersal, migration or seepage of  
23 POLLUTANTS at an INSURED LOCATION during the Term of this  
24 POLICY unless the release, discharge, dispersal, migration, or seepage is  
25 caused by fire, lightning, leakage from fire protective equipment, explosion,  
26 aircraft, vehicles, smoke, riot, civil commotion or vandalism. This POLICY  
does not insure off premises cleanup costs arising from any cause and the  
coverage afforded by this clause shall not be construed otherwise.

27 <sup>4</sup> See also *Optical Servs. USA/JCI v. Franklin Mut. Ins. Co.*, No. BER-L-3681-20, 2020 WL  
28 5806576 (N.J. Super. L. Aug. 13, 2020); *Blue Springs Dental Care, LLC v. Owners Ins. Co.*, No. 20-  
cv-00383, 2020 WL 5637963 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 21, 2020).

1 Policy, Property Coverage, General Conditions, § 7(b). The Policy does not define “contamination,”  
2 but defines “POLLUTANT or CONTAMINANTS” as:

3 any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or CONTAMINANT including, but  
4 not limited to, smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals, virus, waste,  
5 (waste includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed) or hazardous  
6 substances as listed in the Federal WATER Pollution Control Act, Clean Air Act,  
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, and Toxic Substances Control  
Act, or as designated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

7 Policy, Property Coverage, General Conditions, § 13(T).

8 Starr contends that the Pollution and Contamination Exclusion clearly and unambiguously  
9 applies on its face to exclude JGB’s claims. Reply at 24-25. As the insurer, Starr bears the burden to  
10 prove any clause excludes coverage. *See Nat’l Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Havas*, 75 Nev. 301, 303,  
11 339 P.2d 767, 768 (1959). “[I]f an insurer wishes to exclude coverage by virtue of an exclusion in its  
12 policy, it must (1) write the exclusion in obvious and unambiguous language in the policy, (2)  
13 establish that the interpretation excluding covering under the exclusion is the only interpretation that  
14 could fairly be made, and (3) establish that the exclusion clearly applies to this particular case.”  
15 *Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.*, 127 Nev. 156, 164, 252 P.3d 668, 674 (2011) (citing *Alamia v.*  
16 *Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co.*, 495 F. Supp. 2d 362, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)); *see also Belt Painting*  
17 *Corp. v. TIG Ins. Co.*, 100 N.Y.2d 377, 383 (2003) (stating “policy exclusions are given a strict and  
18 narrow construction”). Starr has not shown that it is unreasonable to interpret the Pollution and  
19 Contamination Exclusion to apply only to instances of traditional environmental and industrial  
20 pollution and contamination that is not at issue here,<sup>5</sup> where JGB’s losses are alleged to be the result  
21 of a naturally-occurring, communicable disease. This is the case, even though the Exclusion contains  
22 the word “virus.” *See, e.g., Urogynecology Specialist of Fla. LLC v. Sentinel Ins. Co.*, No. 6:20-cv-  
23 1174, 2020 WL 5939172, at \*4 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 24, 2020) (“Denying coverage for losses stemming  
24 from COVID-19, however, does not logically align with the grouping of the virus exclusion with  
25 other pollutants such that the Policy necessarily anticipated and intended to deny coverage for these  
26

27  
28 <sup>5</sup> *See, e.g., Century Surety Co. v. Casino W., Inc.*, 130 Nev. 395, 398-401, 329 P.3d 614, 616-18  
(2014); *Belt Painting*, 100 N.Y.2d at 383-88.

1 kinds of business losses.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that the Pollution and Contamination  
2 Exclusion does not apply to exclude JGB’s claims.

3 On the second cause of action for declaratory relief, for the reasons stated above (*supra* at 2-  
4 5), the Court finds that JGB’s Complaint sufficiently alleges facts to state a claim upon which relief  
5 can be granted for declaratory relief under Nevada law. *See* N.R.S. 30.010 *et seq.* Accordingly,  
6 Starr’s Motion to Dismiss this cause of action is denied.

7 On the third cause of action, an insurer violates the Unfair Claims Practices Act for, *inter*  
8 *alia*, “[m]isrepresenting to insureds or claimants pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions  
9 relating to any coverage at issue” or “[f]ailing to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements of  
10 claims in which liability of the insurer has become reasonably clear.” N.R.S. 686A.310(1)(a) & (e).  
11 Regarding the fourth cause of action, “an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing [is] in  
12 every contract.” *Pemberton v. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 109 Nev. 789, 792-93, 858 P.2d 380, 382 (1993).  
13 “[W]ith respect to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing . . . ‘[w]hen one party performs a  
14 contract in a manner that is unfaithful to the purpose of the contract and the justified expectations of  
15 the other party are thus denied, damages may be awarded against the party who does not act in good  
16 faith.’” *Perry v. Jordan*, 111 Nev. 943, 948, 900 P.2d 335, 338 (1995) (citing *Hilton Hotels v. Butch*  
17 *Lewis Prods.*, 107 Nev. 226, 234, 808 P.2d 919, 923 (1991)); *see also Pemberton*, 109 Nev. at 793,  
18 858 P.2d at 382 (“An insurer fails to act in good faith when it refuses ‘without proper cause’ to  
19 compensate the insured for a loss covered by the policy.”); *D.K. Prop., Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins.*  
20 *Co. of Pittsburgh, PA.*, 92 N.Y.S.3d 231, 232-34 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2019).


21 The Complaint alleges that Starr denied the claim, did so unreasonably, and did so with  
22 knowledge that denial was unreasonable. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 46, 61. JGB also alleged that Starr  
23 misrepresented the facts of the claim by asserting that “there [wa]s no mention of the [Nevada]  
24 orders having been issued because of physical loss or damage” and that it did “not appear that the  
25 [Nevada] orders in question prohibited access to the insured premises[.]” *Id.* ¶¶ 45-47. Moreover,  
26 JGB alleged that Starr misrepresented the scope of the Policy by citing the Pollution and  
27 Contamination Exclusion to apply to coverage, and by requiring that JGB be “physical prevent[ed]”  
28 from the premises in order to trigger the TIME ELEMENT coverages. *Id.* ¶¶ 48, 49, 52. Finally, JGB



1 alleged consequential damages from Starr's allegedly unreasonable denial of coverage. *See, e.g., id.*  
2 ¶ 83. The Court finds that JGB's Complaint sufficiently alleges facts to state claims upon which  
3 relief can be granted for violation of the Nevada Unfair Claims Practices Act and for breach of the  
4 implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

5 Lastly, Starr's request to deny Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint is denied as moot.

6 **IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED** that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss **IS DENIED IN ITS**  
7 **ENTIRETY** without prejudice.

8   
9 November 30, 2020.

10 Respectfully submitted,

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